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A significant proportion of firms that reorganize under Chapter 11 file for a second 
Chapter 11 protection or liquidate. We use a Asplit-populationB duration model that 
provides useful information regarding factors that could lead to a second bankruptcy. We
find that the probability Žhazard. of a firm re-entering bankruptcy is lower for firms that 
take a long time to reorganize, reduce their debt-to-assets ratio, do not divest, belong to an 
industry that has low capacity utilization and low demand growth. We also find that the 
probability of an average firm re-entering bankruptcy increases for about 4 years before 
declining.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the modification of the bankruptcy laws in 1978 the provision under 
Chapter 11, where financially distressed firms can seek the protection of the court 
from its creditors, has been under close scrutiny. Some observers argue that 
reorganization of a firm under Chapter 11 may not have been successful if it
subsequently files for another bankruptcy. Hotchkiss Ž1995. reports that almost 
40% of the firms in her sample continue to experience operating losses in the 2 
years following emergence from Chapter 11 protection and 15% of the firms
re-enter Chapter 11 a second time. LoPucki and Whitford Ž1993. and Gilson 
Ž1996. also find a large incidence of firms filing for bankruptcy or restructuring 
their debt a second time. 
However, in the presence of liquidation costs ŽShleifer and Vishny, 1992 . and 
agency costs ŽMooradian, 1994 , . a reorganization under Chapter 11 can be 
successful even if the firm files for a second Chapter 11 protection, as long as the 
cash flows to the firm’s claimants exceed what they would have been in 
liquidation. Despite the argument that a second bankruptcy is not necessarily a 
failure, whether a firm re-enters bankruptcy remains an important issue to policy 
makers who monitor the bankruptcy process and also to the creditors and the 
stockholders of reorganized firms. 
In this paper, we address the following issues: How long does it take before a 
firm that has been reorganized under Chapter 11 files for a second Chapter 11
protection or liquidate Žhenceforth referred to as Athe firm re-entering 
bankruptcyB.? What is the probability that an average firm will never file for 
another bankruptcy? Is the relative vulnerability to another bankruptcy influenced 
by firm-specific differences or by changes in industry and economy-wide condi-
tions? In order to address these issues, we observe firms that file for Chapter 11 
and subsequently emerge as reorganized firms between 1979 and 1990. We track 
these firms until 1993 to determine if they re-enter bankruptcy. The variable of 
interest is the time to the second bankruptcy filing, which enables us to analyze the 
vulnerability of a firm over time. We examine how the characteristics of the firm 
and the general business environment in which the firm operates affect this 
variable. Some firms in the sample have not re-entered bankruptcy by the end of 
1993. These firms might re-enter bankruptcy after 1993 Žgiving rise to censored 
observations. or might continue to operate without ever re-entering bankruptcy. A
split-population duration model Žsee Schmidt and Witte, 1989 . is used in the 
estimation. The duration model incorporates censoring to estimate the instanta-
neous probability Žhazard. of a reorganized firm re-entering bankruptcy. The 
AsplitB parameter is included to control for the fact that some firms may never go 
bankrupt once they have emerged from Chapter 11. 
The hazard is specified as a function of firm specific characteristics, industry 
and economy-wide factors. This hazard is also influenced by the time elapsed after 
emergence from Chapter 11. A lower hazard at a point in time implies a smaller 
instantaneous probability of re-entering bankruptcy. We find that firms with a 
lower hazard: Ž . have spent a longer period of time under their first reorganiza-a 
Ž .tion, b have had a larger reduction in their debt-to-assets ratio during reorganiza-
tion, Ž . have experienced a smaller decrease in their lines of businesses during c 
reorganization, Ž . are part of an industry that had a lower capacity utilization at d 
the time of emergence, and Ž . belong to a low demand growth industry. We also e 
find that the estimated hazard of an average firm goes up for about 4 years before 
it begins to decline. This result suggests that a firm that emerged, say, 4 years ago 
is more likely to encounter another bankruptcy as compared to a firm that emerged 
2 years ago. These results are conditional on the fact that some firms may never 
eventually re-enter bankruptcy. For an average firm probability of eventually 
re-entering bankruptcy is approximately 73%. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the dependent and 
the independent variables are described. The methodology used is discussed in 
Section 3. Results and interpretation appear in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Description of the variables 
2.1. The dependent Õariable 
A list of firms that filed for protection under Chapter 11 between 1979 and 
1990 is obtained from the annual reports of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion ŽSEC . This document and the . Corporate Changes Reporter ŽCCR. are used 
to determine which of these firms are reorganized. The filing and the emergence 
years are denoted by tf and te, respectively. After a firm has emerged from 
Chapter 11 protection it is tracked until 1993, the year that is chosen for the end of 
our study.1 A record of whether or not during this period the firm either re-enters 
Chapter 11 protection or files for liquidation under Chapter 7 is made. The exact 
filing and emergence dates of the first reorganization and the date of re-entry into 
a second bankruptcy are obtained from the CCR, the Directory of Obsolete 
Securities ŽDOS , . the Wall Street Journal Index ŽWSJI. and the Bankruptcy 
Almanac ŽBA . If no information on the firm re-entering bankruptcy from . te until 
1993 is obtained in the above publications, it is assumed that the firm continues to 
operate. To verify that the firm is indeed operating, the Standard and Poor’s 
Register of Corporations, Directors and ExecutiÕes and the Compustat database 
are used. This is done to ensure that just because the CCR, DOS, WSJI or the BA 
does not report a re-entry into bankruptcy, it is not erroneously assumed that the 
firm continues to operate.2 
1 Ten firms from our original data set are deleted from the sample because they are merged or 
acquired as a part of the reorganization plan. This is necessary since it is not possible to track merged 
or acquired firms to determine if they re-enter bankruptcy. For example, Evans Products Žwhich filed 
for protection on March 12, 1985 and emerged on July 2, 1986. merged with Grossman’s as a part of 
the reorganization plan. It is not possible to determine if Evans Products re-enters bankruptcy since 
only Grossman’s can be tracked after July 2, 1986. However, there are a few instances when the firm 
continues to operate as a separate entity even after the merger. For example, HRT Industries. Žwhich 
filed for protection on November 23, 1982 and emerged on February 10, 1984 . merged into a 
subsidiary of McCrory, effective April 19, 1985. We are able to track HRT Industries since it continued 
to operate as a separate entity. Few firms merge after a significantly long time after emergence and are 
treated as censored observations. 
For example, Altec Žwhich filed for protection on September 26, 1983 and emerged on May 21, 
1987. is dropped from the sample because no additional information regarding this firm is available 
after 1988 from any of the above-mentioned publications and the Compustat database. We drop 23 
firms for this reason. 
2 
Fig. 1. The sequence of events after the firm’s first Chapter 11 filing. t is the date the firm files forf 
Chapter 11 protection; t is the date the firm emerges from Chapter 11 protection; All emerged firms e
Ž107. are tracked until the end of 1993. Forty-two firms re-enter bankruptcy and 65 continue to operate;
The dependent variable is Ž t y t . for firms that re-enter bankruptcy Žcompleted observation . and c e
Ž t y te . for firms that continue to operate until 1993 censored observation ; . Ž  t y tf is the time taken 93 Ž e . 
to reorganize the first time and is used as an independent variable. 
The dependent variable is the time Žduration. between the firm’s emergence 
from Chapter 11 and the firm’s re-entry into bankruptcy. This variable enables us 
to analyze the vulnerability of firms over time. The sequence of events after a firm 
files for its first Chapter 11 protection is described in Fig. 1 where the dependent
variable is Ž t y t . for completed observations and Ž t y t . for censored observa-c e  93  e  
tions. Data are available for 107 firms, of which 42 firms re-enter bankruptcy.3 
Note that the recidivism in our sample is larger than in a related study by 
Ž .Hotchkiss 1995 . She tracks reorganized firms for 3 years and firms that have not 
re-entered bankruptcy by that time are implicitly treated as ones that will never do 
so. We find that 57% of the firms in our sample that re-enter bankruptcy do so 
after 3 years. 
A firm that does not re-enter bankruptcy results in a censored observation since 
we do not when, and indeed if, such a firm will file for bankruptcy. Thus, the 
sample consists of completed and censored durations. The frequency distribution 
of firms re-entering bankruptcy is presented in Fig. 2. These firms are associated 
with completed observations since the exact duration of time to bankruptcy on 
only these firms is known. For the firms that re-file for bankruptcy, it takes an 
average time of 3.6 years. A large proportion of firms re-entering bankruptcy do 
so within 6 years of their re- organization, with only four firms taking more than 6 
years. 
2.2. The independent Õariables 
The following independent variables represent the postulated firm specific, 
industry and economy-wide factors that contribute to the future success of a 
reorganized firm. 
3 Seventeen firms are dropped from the sample because firm specific variables are not available
Ž . Compustat, bŽ .  Disclosure c Moody’s Manuals Ž .  from: a Ž .  d the firm’s annual 10K filings with the 
SEC. 
Fig. 2. Frequency distribution of firms that re-enter bankruptcy. 
2.2.1. The time the firm spends under Chapter 11 (Duration 1 ) 
This is defined as the period between tf and te, the time the firm spends under 
Chapter 11 protection while it reorganizes. There are several reasons for the 
inclusion of Duration 1 as a control variable. Many authors Žsee, e.g., Jensen, 
1989; Gilson et al., 1990. point out that the primary disadvantage of reorganiza-
tion under Chapter 11 is its relative cost. Both direct costs Žfees to accountants and 
lawyers. and indirect costs Žlost sales or profits due to the constraints imposed by 
the trustee. of Chapter 11 filing depend on the length of a firm’s stay under 
Chapter 11 protection. A higher cost of reorganization could enhance the possibil-
ity of future financial difficulties. On the contrary, a longer time in Chapter 11 
may provide the firm with sufficient protection needed to reorganize successfully
Ž .see Maksimovic and Phillips, 1998 . For these reasons the effect of Duration 1 on 
the failure probability is ambiguous, a priori. 
(2.2.2. Assets of the firm when it emerges from its first Chapter 11 protection Log 
Assets) 
This variable, measured by the natural log of total assets at the time the firm 
emerges from Chapter 11, is included to control for firm size. In general, large 
firms have greater ability to raise additional funds in the capital market ŽWhite, 
.1984; Casey et al., 1986 . It is expected that the larger the firm the lower is the 
probability of the firm re-entering bankruptcy. 
(2.2.3. The change in the leÕerage of the firm during reorganization Change in 
DebtrAssets) 
This variable, measured by the difference between the debt-to-assets ratio of the 
firm at the time it emerges from the time it files for Chapter 11, is included to 
capture the ability of the firm to lower its indebtedness. A firm in financial distress
is likely to have a high debt-to-assets ratio. Opler and Titman Ž1994. show that 
high debt adversely affects operating performance since in an industry downturn, 
high debt firms lose more sales than firms with low debt. It is important to note 
that high debt ratios may actually be the optimal capital structure for a reorganized
Ž . Ž .firm. For instance, Harris and Raviv 1990 and Hart and Moore 1995 show that 
high levels of debt curbs the managers’ ability to make unprofitable but empire-
building investments, and to trigger liquidation if the firms’ assets become more 
valuable elsewhere. However, it is postulated that a higher debt-to-assets ratio, 
irrespective of its optimality, contributes to a greater risk of the firm encountering 
another bankruptcy.4 
(2.2.4. The change in the CEO while the firm undergoes reorganization Change in 
CEO) 
Some observers contend that the Chapter 11 process is inefficient, in part, 
because of the provision of the bankruptcy code that allows incumbent manage-
ment to retain control of the firm in bankruptcy and propose a reorganization plan. 
It is alleged that managers acting on the behalf of the shareholders ŽBebchuk and 
Chang, 1992 . and in their own self-interest ŽBoot, 1992 . are biased towards the 
continuation of an insolvent firm. Jensen Ž1993. adds that when managers shut 
plants or liquidate firms, this process A . . . causes personal pain, creates uncertainty 
and interrupts or sidetracks careers. Rather than confronting this pain, managers 
generally resist such action as long as they have cash flow to subsidize the losing 
operations.B The CEO change variable is included to examine if a change in
management Žor lack thereof . has an impact on the future success of the firm. If 
the incumbent management does indeed bias the Chapter 11 process towards the 
continuation of inefficient firms, then firms that appoint a new CEO during 
reorganization should have a lower probability of re-entering bankruptcy. 
2.2.5. The change in the number of lines of businesses during reorganization 
(Change in aSIC) 
It is argued that firms that are more diversified at the time of the Chapter 11 
filing are more successful after emergence, since they have the capability to 
operate after divesting unsuccessful lines of businesses. The immediate benefit of 
4 In fact, our raw data suggest that of the 20 firms with the highest value of Change in DebtrAssets, 
11 re-entered bankruptcy by 1993. By comparison, only six firms out of the 20 with the lowest value 
re-enter bankruptcy. 
divesting is an increase in liquidity and a return to core lines of businesses. 
However, since the market for assets of a bankrupt firm is generally thin, it is 
easier for firms to sell only those assets that are in relatively high demand. 
ŽMaksimovic and Phillips 1998. find that bankrupt firms that sell and close plants 
over time are associated with a decrease in overall firm performance. The Change 
in aSIC variable, measured by the change in the number of 4-digit Standard
Industrial Classification ŽSIC . codes listed for the firm during reorganization, is 
included to control for these factors. The impact of this variable on the likelihood 
of future success of the firm is ambiguous. 
2.2.6. Industry capacity utilization when the firm emerges from Chapter 11 
(Capacity Utilization) 
Often, firm performance is dictated by industry-wide conditions. Lang and
Stulz Ž1992. find that the performance of a firm is affected by Chapter 11 filings
by other firms in the industry. Shleifer and Vishny Ž1992. argue that the market 
for a firm’s assets will be illiquid when other firms in the same industry are also
distressed. John et al. Ž1992. find that distressed firms often cite exogenous, 
industry shocks as causes for their decline. The Capacity Utilization variable is 
included to control for these factors. However, a comparison of good vs. bad 
industry conditions cannot be made accurately based solely on the capacity 
utilization rate since capacity utilization generally differs across industries at all 
times. Therefore, we define a variable that represents the capacity utilization of the 
industry in the year the firm emerges from Chapter 11, deflated by the industry 
peak capacity utilization in the previous business cycle.5 The operating perfor-
mance of the firm’s industry relative to peak performance has two counteracting 
forces on the hazard of a firm re-entering bankruptcy. A healthy industry implies 
that a firm in that industry has a better chance of survival as compared to a similar 
firm in a poorly performing industry. However, a high capacity utilization might 
be the reason that the bankrupt firm was able to emerge from Chapter 11 
protection, although inherently the firm was not financially viable. Thus, this 
variable has an ambiguous impact on the firm’s probability of another bankruptcy. 
2.2.7. Industry growth oÕer a 10-year period (Demand Growth ) 
This is another variable that controls for industry-specific differences. It 
measures the long-term growth prospects of an industry.6 Unlike, the capacity 
utilization variable that is computed at the emergence year, the demand growth 
variable is computed for a fixed period between 1982 and 1992. This allows 
demand growth to be more industry specific as compared to the capacity utiliza-
tion variable that may also be influenced by idiosyncratic economy-wide condi-
5 For our sample period, the monthly highs for the previous business cycle occurred in 1988–1989. 
Ž .Maksimovic and Phillips 1998 point out that this variable also captures cost shifts from increased 
foreign imports or shocks to production costs, as well as demand changes in the industry. 
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tions in the year the firm emerges from Chapter 11. Maksimovic and Phillips
Ž1998. show that the average productivity of firms that become bankrupt, plant 
closures and asset sales during bankruptcy, and the optimal resolution of bankruptcy 
depend on the level of industry demand. A higher proportion of firms that file for 
bankruptcy are from low demand growth industries. However, while bankrupt 
firms in low demand growth industries do not have significantly lower productiv-
ity than their industry counterparts, those in high demand growth industries are 
under-performers. Given these findings it is postulated that the higher the industry 
demand growth the greater is the probability of re-entering bankruptcy. 
2.2.8. The rate of growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the time 
the firm emerges from Chapter 11 (GDP Growth ) 
This variable, measured by the 3-year average GDP growth after the firm 
emerges from Chapter 11, is included to control for economy-wide factors that 
affect the general environment in which the firm is operating. A priori, the effect 
of the GDP Growth variable on the hazard is similar to the impact of the Capacity 
Utilization variable. A relatively healthy economy at the time of the emergence of 
the firm from Chapter 11 may result in a better chance of survival as compared to 
a similar firm that emerges from protection at a time when the economy is 
performing relatively poorly. However, a high GDP growth might have assisted 
the firm to emerge from Chapter 11 protection, although the firm was not 
sufficiently healthy. Thus, this variable also has an ambiguous impact on the 
firm’s probability of another bankruptcy. 
The actual filing and emergence dates used to compute Duration 1 are obtained 
from CCR, DOS, WSJI and BA. The total assets of the firm at te are used to 
compute Log Assets. The long-term debtrtotal assets ratio of the firm is obtained 
for te and tf and the difference is used to calculate Change in DebtrAssets. Data 
on Log Assets and Change in DebtrAssets are obtained from Compustat, Disclo-
sure, Moody’s Manuals and 10K filings of the firm with the SEC. 
The Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors and ExecutiÕes is 
used to collect data on the Change in CEO and the Change in aSIC variables. For 
each firm the names of the CEO as well as the number of 4-digit SIC categories 
listed are obtained for tf and te. By comparing the names, the Change in CEO 
variable is constructed. If over time this position is created or dropped then it is 
recorded as a change. The Change in aSIC is constructed by taking the difference 
between the number of SIC listings at te and tf . To obtain the Capacity Utilization 
variable, we first classify firms according to their SIC code at the time of 
emergence. The capacity utilization corresponding to the firm’s industry for the 
year it emerged from protection, and the peak industry capacity utilization for the 
previous business cycle are obtained from the Federal ReserÕe Bulletin. The  
demand growth variable is also constructed on the basis of SIC codes. For each 
firm, its industry growth rate between 1982 and 1992 of the value of product 
shipments is computed. The value of product shipments is available for the 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
Variables Mean Median Standard Difference 
)deviation in means 
aDuration 1 1.973 1.728 1.257 0.597 
aLog Assets 3.748 3.719 2.289 y0.867 
aChange in DebtrAssets 0.079 0.012 0.337 0.113 
Change in CEO 0.505 1.000 0.502 y0.086 
Change in aSIC y0.551 0.000 3.286 0.163 
Capacity Utilization 94.25 95.16 4.793 y0.432 
Demand Growth 0.707 0.676 0.845 0.170 
GDP Growth 2.455 2.642 1.205 0.125 
Ø Duration 1: the number of years that the firm spends under Chapter 11.
 
Ø Log Assets: natural log of assets, in millions of US$, of the firm at emergence.
 
Ø Change in DebtrAssets: the change in the debt-to-assets ratio during reorganization.
 
Ø Change in CEO: 1 if CEO changes during reorganization; 0 otherwise.
 
Ø Change in aSIC: the change in the number of 4-digit SIC listings during reorganization.
 
Ø Capacity Utilization: the capacity utilization of the industry of the firm at emergence.
 
Ø Demand Growth: the industry growth rate of the firm between 1982 and 1992.
 
Ø GDP Growth: the average GDP growth rate of 3 years after the emergence.
 
aDenote significance at 5%. 
) Represents the difference in means between the firms that re-enter bankruptcy and the ones that 
continue to operate at the end of 1993. 
manufacturing industries. For other industries, similar measures are used to 
calculate demand growth. For example, the value of construction work is used to 
compute the demand growth for the construction industries. The data are obtained 
from various publications of the Census Bureau. The GDP is obtained from the 
International Financial Statistics database. Three-year moving averages for GDP 
growth are created using the series. 
Descriptive statistics on the independent variables appear in Table 1. The mean, 
the median and the standard deviation are reported in the first three columns using 
all the firms in the sample. The last column reports the difference in means of the 
variables between the firms that re-enter bankruptcy and the ones that continue to 
operate at the end of 1993. We find that the means are significantly different at 5% 
for the Duration 1, the Log Assets, and the Change in DebtrAssets variables. The 
averages of all the firms in the sample indicate that the average firm: 
Ž . spends almost 2 years in its first reorganization, a 
Ž . at the time of emergence has total assets of US$509 million with a high b 
standard deviation of US$2,660 million. The median assets are US$41 million.7 
7 The natural log of total assets is used as an independent variable to control for a high variability 
and skewness of total assets. Results do not change qualitatively when total assets is used instead. 
Ž . emerges as a firm with a slightly higher debt-to-assets ratio, c
 
Ž . has a 50.5% chance of a change in CEO while it reorganizes,
 d 
Ž . undergoes a reduction in the number of lines of businesses it owns while it e 
reorganizes,
Ž .f is part of an industry that has a capacity utilization relative to peak capacity 
of 94.25% in the firm’s emergence year,
Ž . is part of an industry that has a 10-year demand growth of 70.7%, g
Ž . operates in an environment where the average GDP growth 3 years after h
 
emergence from reorganization is 2.45%.
 
The 107 firms are distributed across 83 different 4-digit SIC categories. The 
largest concentration is in the Aeating placesB and Avariety storesB industries with 
six and four firms, respectively. Overall, there are 15 industries that have two or 
more firms. 
3. The methodology 
Since the dependent variable is a duration, the appropriate estimation methodol-
ogy is duration Žalternatively known as hazard rate . models. As is customary in 
applications of duration models, it is the hazard rate that is analyzed. The hazard 
rate is the instantaneous probability of an agent making a transition from one state 
to another, given that the transition has not already occurred. In the context of this 
paper, the hazard is the instantaneous probability that a firm that has emerged from 
Chapter 11 protection moves from a solvent to a bankrupt state. 
An implicit assumption made in most survival time models is that of certain 
exit, which in this context implies that all reorganized firms will eventually go
bankrupt. We use a split-population duration model Žsee Schmidt and Witte, 1989 . 
that takes into account the possibility that the transition from one state to another 
may neÕer occur. This adjustment is appropriate since the firm that has emerged 
from Chapter 11 once may never re-enter bankruptcy. Thus, the probability that a 
firm will eventually fail is postulated to be less than one. The model estimates the
instantaneous probability of failure Žhazard. at a point in time along with the 
probability of eventual failure. 
Duration models are represented in terms of the density, survivor, and hazard
functions, denoted by f tŽ ; X ., S tŽ ; X ., and  h tŽ ; X ., respectively. The duration 
variable is T which denotes the length of time that a reorganized firm takes to 
re-enter bankruptcy. These functions are conditional on the independent variables, 
8X. The likelihood function consists of f tŽ ; X . for completed durations and 
8 See Kiefer Ž1988 , . Jaggia and Thosar Ž1995. and Baek and Bandopadhyaya Ž1996. for a 
Ž .description and applications of standard duration model and Gucht and Moore 1998 for a split-popu-
lation model. 
S tŽ ; X . for censored observations. The survivor function captures the fact that the 
duration of the observation is at least as long as implied by the censoring point. 
Let C be an indicator variable that equals 1 if the duration is complete and 0 if it 
is censored. The duration is complete for firms that re-enter bankruptcy, and 
censored for those firms that do not, during the observation period. The standard 
duration model assumes that censored firms will eventually re-enter bankruptcy. 
The split-population duration model allows the possibility that some censored 
firms may never re-enter bankruptcy. Let U be an unobservable variable that 
equals 1 if the firm eventually fails and 0 otherwise. Then, 
P UŽ s1.sd , P Us0.s1yd . Ž .  1Ž 
Here, d is the Asplit-population parameterB that denotes the probability of 
eventual failure. If d-1, then a proportion of the censored firms will never 
re-enter bankruptcy. For a firm that has re-entered bankruptcy, we have Ts t and 
Cs1. The appropriate density for such a firm is therefore, 
P Us1. Ž  f t  ; X ,U s1 sd f tŽ ; X ,U s1 .  Ž .  Ž  . .  2 
For a censored observation ŽCs0 , all we know is that the firm has not re-entered . 
bankruptcy during the observation period. We entertain two possibilities, Ž . that a 
the firm would have re-entered if it were followed longer and Ž . that this firm b 
would never re-enter bankruptcy. Specifically, 
P Cs0 sP UŽ s0 qP UŽ s1 P T) t ; X ,U s1.Ž .  .  . Ž
s1ydqdS t  ; X ,Us1 .  3Ž .  Ž .  
Ž .  Ž .The likelihood function consists of expressions 2 and 3 above for completed 
and censored durations, respectively. This likelihood function can be constructed 
once the hazard function is parameterized. In this paper, we use a log-logistic 
hazard function that has a property that it declines for sufficiently large T. This 
function is appropriate since, for a reorganized firm that has operated successfully 
for a reasonably long period of time, the probability of re-entering bankruptcy is 
expected to decline. The log-logistic hazard function is given by: 
ay1 a y1h t  ; X ,Us1 sexpŽ Xb a t 1qexpŽ Xb t . . Ž .  4Ž . . Ž . 
Xbsb0 qb1 X1 qb2 X2 q . . .  qbk Xk and the Xj’s are the firm-specific, indus-
try and economy-wide variables and a is the shape parameter of the hazard. It is 
useful to note that if a variable has a positive impact on the hazard, then it has a 
negative impact on the duration to second bankruptcy. The log-likelihood function
for a split-population model that uses Ž .4 to compute Ž . and 32 Ž . above is: 
N 
ln Ls ÝC lndq lna Ž wqwy2ln 1qexpŽ . . 
is1 
qŽ1yC . ln 1ydqd 1qexp w y1 5Ž Ž Ž .  . . Ž .  
where wsXbqa ln t and the X ’s are all the independent variables discussed in 
Section 2.2. The split parameter d allows the probability of eventual failure to be 
different from one and if the estimated d is not significantly different from 1, the 
split model is converges to a standard hazard model.9 The parameter estimates are 
obtained by maximizing the above log-likelihood function.10 
4. Results and interpretation 
In our model we estimate the probability of a second bankruptcy given the firm 
specific and other factors at the time the firm emerges from its first bankruptcy, 
and the time path of this probability. Parameter estimates from the split log-lo-
gistic model appear in Table 2. We also include in this table the estimates from the 
standard log-logistic model for comparison. Although the results of the two 
models are similar in terms of the sign and significance of the variables, the split 
parameter model is more appropriate. We find that the estimate of the split 
parameter is 0.727 and is significantly different from one at any level of 
significance. The estimate implies that an average reorganized firm faces only a 
73% probability of another bankruptcy. For an individual firm, cross-sectional 
differences are captured by the hazard function. At any given point after reorgani-
zation, the hazard will differ between firms. Further, the hazard varies over time. 
We begin with a discussion of the impact of the characteristics of the firm and 
the general business environment in which the firm operates on the instantaneous 
probability of the firm re-entering bankruptcy.11 The time the firm spends under 
Chapter 11 the first time ŽDuration 1 . has a significant, negative influence on the 
hazard. This implies that the longer a firm spends under its first reorganization, the 
lower is the hazard of a subsequent bankruptcy. A longer reorganization process is 
often perceived as inefficient, because it imposes higher bankruptcy costs. How-
ever, as documented by Maksimovic and Phillips Ž1998 , . a relatively longer 
protection period enables many firms in bankruptcy to enhance their level of 
productivity, which makes the costs related to bankruptcy worthwhile to incur. 
9 It should be mentioned that d can also be a function of the X variables that are used in the hazard. 
However, as pointed out by a referee, since economic theory provides no direction, it is difficult to 
identify the influence of the same variable on both the hazard and the probability of eventual failure.
10 Maximum likelihood estimates are obtained using the MAXLIK module of the GAUSS program-
ming language. Consistent estimate of the variance–covariance matrix of the parameters is derived as 
y1 Ž T y1.H  G G H  where H and G denote the Hessian and the gradient evaluated at the maximum 
likelihood estimates of the parameters.
Although we discuss the sign and significance of the hazard parameters Ž .b , it should be pointed 
out that the magnitude of the influence of the factors also depends on the estimated value of d . 
Therefore, the marginal contribution of a factor on the probability of a second bankruptcy depends on 
the estimated eventual failure probability of 0.727. 
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Table 2 
Estimates of log-logistic and split-population log-logistic models 
Variables Log-logistic model Split-population 
log-logistic model 
b aConstant Ž b . y11.11 Žy1.597. y18.10 Žy2.196.0 
a aDuration 1 Ž b . y0.482 Žy3.118. y0.657 Žy3.487.1
 
b
Log Assets Ž b . y0.158 Žy1.302. y0.175 Žy1.206.2 
a aChange in DebtrAssets Ž b . 1.671 Ž3.002. 1.542 Ž2.709.3
Ž 4 . Ž . Ž .Change in CEO b 0.154 0.326 0.372 0.549 
aChange in aSIC Ž b . y0.073 Žy1.091. y0.541 Žy3.463. 
a 
5
Ž . Ž . Ž .Capacity Utilization b 0.087 1.204 0.162 1.8946 
Demand Growth Ž b7 . 0.275b Ž1.374. 0.398b Ž1.391. 
Ž 8 . Ž . Ž .GDP Growth b 0.218 0.843 0.160 0.451 
a, ) a, )a 1.734 Ž3.656. 2.210 Ž4.227. 
a, ) Žd 0.727 2.638. 
The t-statistics are presented in the parentheses.
 
Ø The coefficients b ’s capture the influence of the regressors on the hazard.
 
Ø The shape parameter a determines the point after which the hazard declines.
 
Ø The split parameter d represents the probability of eventual failure.
 
aDenote significance at 5%. 
bDenote significance at 10%. 
) For a and d , the  t-statistic is evaluated at 1. 
The change in the debt-to-assets ratio variable is significant with a positive 
coefficient. The higher the debt-to-assets ratio at the time of emergence relative to 
the ratio at the time of filing the greater is the hazard. This result is of significant 
importance since we find that the average firm in our sample emerges with a 
higher debt-to-assets ratio as compared to when it files for protection. Gilson
Ž1996. also reports an increase in leverage during reorganization and reports a 
higher incidence of recurring bankruptcy for firms that remain more leveraged 
after restructuring their debt. Our result is consistent with the argument that firms 
that emerge from bankruptcy with relatively high debt ratios are adversely affected
by the leverage ŽOpler and Titman, 1994 . and are ones that have poor growth 
opportunities ŽAlderson and Betker, 1995 . . As argued before, a relatively high 
debtrasset ratio may be optimal for the firm, an argument that is not contradictory 
to our finding. Firms that emerge with high debt ratios that are optimal are ones 
whose monitors have determined that the high leverage is necessary to impose 
discipline on the managers and use it as a means to trigger liquidation if necessary. 
Perhaps, high leverage can be interpreted as a signal that the firm is more likely to 
encounter another bankruptcy because its growth opportunities are likely to be 
limited andror the stakeholders have perceived that liquidation is a possibility. 
The change during reorganization of the number of SIC codes listed for the 
firm has a negative impact on the hazard. The more the number of lines of 
businesses that the firm has, at the time it emerges relative to when it filed for 
protection, the lower is the hazard. The average firm in our sample emerges with a 
smaller number of lines of businesses. This is consistent with the finding in John
et al. Ž1992. that, in response to decline in earnings, diversified firms retrench 
quickly and increase their focus on core operations. Our result indicates that, on 
balance, for the future viability of the firm excessive divesting may not be prudent. 
This could be because bankrupt firms seeking liquidity often have to sell their 
more profitable lines of businesses leaving the firm with plants that are less 
Ž .productive Maksimovic and Phillips, 1998 , which contributes to a higher proba-
bility of repeated bankruptcy in the future. 
The capacity utilization variable is significant with a positive sign. This 
indicates that the higher the capacity utilization of the firm’s industry relative to 
peak performance at the time of emergence, the greater is the probability of the
firm re-entering bankruptcy. Bandopadhyaya Ž1994. reports that it is easier for a 
firm to reorganize if it is in a high-capacity utilization industry. The finding in our 
paper suggests that the firms that took advantage of the favorable industry 
conditions at the time of their emergence, without necessarily being healthy 
enterprises in themselves, are more likely to encounter financial difficulties in the 
future. Firms that emerge from Chapter 11 protection in spite of hostile industry 
conditions are more likely to succeed in the future. 
Interestingly, the change in the CEO of a firm has an insignificant impact on 
the hazard. Arguments in the literature suggest that incumbent managers ineffi-
ciently continue a losing enterprise when it should have been liquidated ŽJensen, 
1993; Hotchkiss, 1995 . . This tendency of managers gives rise to the possibility 
that firms that undergo reorganization with their original managers are more likely 
to encounter further financial difficulties. The evidence in this paper suggests that 
a management change or a lack thereof, does not influence the probability of the 
firm re-entering bankruptcy. This result is consistent with findings in Hotchkiss
and Mooradian Ž1997 , who argue that the dynamics of the bankruptcy process . 
have changed with the rise of AvultureB investors, who frequently take over the 
management of the firms in which they have invested. Thus, for samples including 
bankruptcies in the late 1980s and early 1990s management may not be insulated 
from external discipline. 
The demand growth variable has a positive effect on the hazard. This is 
consistent with Maksimovic and Phillips’s Ž1998. finding that productivity of 
bankrupt firms in relatively high demand growth industries is lower than their 
industry counterparts. Thus, reorganized firms from high growth industries are at a 
greater risk of a second bankruptcy filing since they are more likely to be industry 
under-performers. 
Finally, the total assets, and the GDP growth variables have an insignificant 
effect on the hazard suggesting that firm size and the general economy wide 
conditions do not play a significant role in determining the probability of future 
financial difficulties. Although the literature suggests that larger firms have easier 
access to financial markets, apparently that alone does not have a significant 
influence on the firm’s ability to ward off future bankruptcy. Similarly, after 
controlling for firms specific and industry characteristics, purely economy wide 
conditions do not play a major role in determining if the firm will re-file for 
bankruptcy.12 
As mentioned in the methodology section, a log-logistic function implies a 
hazard that declines for sufficiently long durations. The value of a determines the 
location of the point after which the hazard function declines. In particular, if 
aF1, the hazard declines monotonically; and if a)1, the hazard attains a 
maximum before it begins to decline. The estimated value of a is 1.734 for the 
standard and 2.210 for the split model, which are both statistically greater than 1. 
The plots of the estimated hazard, evaluated at the mean values of the variables, 
for both models are presented in Fig. 3. Notice that the hazard of the split model 
increases initially, reaching a peak at about 4 years, and declines sharply there-
after. In comparison, the decline of the hazard of the standard model is very 
gentle. This result is not surprising since the standard model expects all firms to 
re-enter bankruptcy and consequently predicts a high hazard even beyond 6 years. 
The split model suggests a significant decline in the hazard after 4 years since it 
appropriately takes into account that not all firms will eventually fail. This shape 
of the estimated hazard for the split model is intuitively appealing. A firm that 
reorganizes under Chapter 11 has a low instantaneous probability of failure shortly 
after emergence. However, the firm remains vulnerable to another bankruptcy and 
this vulnerability increases over time. If the firm is able to endure this increased 
vulnerability up to a critical time period the probability of re-entering bankruptcy 
sharply declines. 
ŽIt should be noted that the hazard stays quite high about 10% or more. even up 
to 6 years after emergence, a finding that is consistent with the histogram in Fig. 
2. In fact, the specification of the split model is justified since the estimated hazard
Ž . Ž .Fig. 3 emulates the actual frequency of bankruptcies Fig. 2 extremely well. It 
seems that firms that are reorganized under Chapter 11 stay vulnerable for a 
relatively long period of time. It can be argued that all firms, including the ones 
that have never been reorganized, are at some risk of bankruptcy. In fact, after a 
sufficiently long period of time, some of the effects of the first reorganization 
wears off and the hazard of the reorganized firm converges to that of any firm. 
However, the obvious time dependence shown in the early years after reorganiza-
tion in the plotted hazard indicates that this hazard is associated only with firms 
that have been reorganized. 
In order to examine the influence of various explanatory variables on the hazard 
more closely, we estimate the average hazard for firms with different values of the 
variables. For each variable, we divide our sample into quartiles and compute the 
average quartile value. In Table 3 we present the estimated hazard at year 4 at the 
average quartiles with the remaining variables at their overall averages. This 
12 Results are robust to alternative measures of economic conditions, such as interest rates. 
Fig. 3. The estimated hazard of the log-logistic and split-population log-logistic models. 
enables us to highlight the magnitude of the influence of each variable on the 
hazard. For instance, the hazard of an average firm in the first quartile of Change
in DebtrAssets is 0.095; this hazard is significantly higher Ž0.166. for firms that 
are in the fourth quartile. The hazards of a firm in the first and fourth quartiles of 
Duration 1 are 0.170 and 0.069, respectively. Similarly, the average hazard for 
firms in the fourth quartile of the capacity utilization variable is more than two 
times than that of firms in the first quartile. 
Table 3 
Average hazard at year 4 for different quartiles of the explanatory variables 
Variables Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Duration 1 0.170 0.157 0.123 0.069 
Log Assets 0.160 0.142 0.125 0.102 
Change in DebtrAssets 0.095 0.123 0.138 0.166 
Change in CEO 0.121 0.121 0.144 0.144 
Change in aSIC 0.170 0.114 0.114 0.087 
Capacity Utilization 0.070 0.127 0.154 0.168 
Demand Growth 0.110 0.123 0.137 0.158 
GDP Growth 0.116 0.129 0.140 0.146 
Ø The hazard is computed from the estimated split-population log-logistic duration model.
 
Ø The hazard is estimated for different quartiles of a given variable with the remaining variables
 
evaluated at their means.
 
5. Conclusion 
For the stakeholders of a firm it is important to know what the future prospects 
of the firm are after a reorganization under Chapter 11. Would the firm re-file for 
Chapter 11 or liquidate, and if so when, or would it continue to operate 
successfully? In this paper we examine if a reorganized firm will eventually go 
bankrupt and when for a vulnerable firm this will happen. Firms that emerge from 
Chapter 11 protection are observed over time and their performance after emer-
gence is recorded. We use a split-population duration model that controls for the 
fact that some firms may never go bankrupt once they have emerged from Chapter 
11. We find that the probability of an average firm eventually re-entering 
bankruptcy is 73%. 
It has been documented that the financial woes of a firm are not only due to 
factors that are firm specific but also are linked to industry conditions. In a similar 
vein, one could argue that a re-occurrence of bankruptcy could be due to actions 
taken by the firm during re- organization or industry and economy-wide factors 
could dictate it. We use both sets of factors to estimate the vulnerability of a firm 
to another bankruptcy after it has been re- organized under Chapter 11. Of the firm 
specific variables, we find that this vulnerability is lower for firms that have spent 
a longer period of time under Chapter 11 protection, have lowered their leverage, 
and have retained a larger number of lines of businesses. The industry conditions 
also play a critical role in the re-occurrence of bankruptcy. We find that firms in 
the highest quartile of industry capacity utilization are more than two times more 
vulnerable than firms in the lowest quartile. Firms from high demand growth 
industries are more likely to file for another bankruptcy. 
The estimated hazard increases initially and then begins to decline after 
approximately 4 years, implying that the instantaneous probability of a firm 
re-entering bankruptcy continues to increase up to 4 years. Furthermore, we find 
that this probability, although on the decline, remains high for almost 6 years after 
emergence. This suggests that the financial woes of a reorganized firm persist for a 
significant length of time. The vulnerability of a reorganized firm over a relatively 
long period of time, and the influence of various aspects of reorganization and 
industry conditions on this vulnerability has important implications for the credi-
tors and the stockholders of the firm and also for policy makers who monitor the 
bankruptcy process. 
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